Virtue Ethics, Role Ethics, and Business Ethics

Abstract

Abstract Much has been written in substantive moral philosophy from the perspective of the ‘big three’ theories: Kantianism, Virtue Ethics, and Consequentialism (Baron, Pettit, and Slote 1997). Considerably less has been written about the nature of a Kantian, virtue ethical, or consequentialist role ethics. Part of the explanation for this neglect lies in scepticism about role ethics itself, or at least scepticism about its importance or centrality. In this chapter I remedy the neglect by elaborating my own conception of a virtue ethical role ethics, showing how my view handles apparent role conflict, and conflict between role ethics and ‘ordinary morality’.

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