Enhancing Traceability in Wine Supply Chains through Blockchain: A Stackelberg Game-Theoretical Analysis

Abstract

Blockchain technology has been adopted to improve traceability and authenticity in wine supply chains (WSCs). However, whether through outsourcing or self-implementation of a blockchain-based wine traceability system (BTS), there are significant costs involved, as well as concerns regarding consumer privacy. Motivated by observations of real-world practice, we explore the value of blockchain in enhancing traceability and authenticity in WSCs through a Stackelberg game-theoretical analysis. By comparing the equilibrium solutions of the scenarios with and without blockchain, we uncover the value of blockchain in tracing wine products. Our findings show that blockchain adoption can increase WSC prices under certain conditions. We derive the threshold for a third-party BTS service fee that determines blockchain adoption for tracing wine products and reveal the moderating effect of consumer traceability preferences and privacy concerns. Furthermore, the investigation of who should lead the implementation of BTS finds that the equal cost sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer results in no difference in BTS implementation leadership. Otherwise, the manufacturer always benefits from taking the lead in the implementation of BTS, and the retailer should undertake a leadership role in BTS implementation if they need to bear higher costs.

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