Can Reverse Mixed-Ownership Reform Reduce the Cost of Equity Financing of Private Enterprises?

Abstract

How to leverage the advantages of state-owned capital to promote the high-quality development of private enterprises is a central issue of mixed-ownership reform. We empirically explore the effect of reverse mixed-ownership reform on the cost of equity financing for private enterprises and the underlying mechanism from two perspectives: equity structure and high-level governance using fixed-effect and IV regressions. We find that reverse mixed-ownership reform significantly reduces the cost of equity financing for private enterprises. The mediation effect tests suggest that the improvement of information disclosure quality and equity liquidity partially play intermediary roles in the relation between the reform and the equity financing cost. Heterogeneity tests suggest that cost of equity financing for private enterprises are significantly reduced for firms operating in highly competitive industry environment and firms located in regions with lower level of marketization. We contribute to the understanding of the economic consequences of reverse mixed-ownership reform and provide policy insights for further advancing the reform in private enterprises while effectively harnessing the advantages of state-owned capital.

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