Development of Regulatory Strategies in the Sharing Economy: The Application of Game Theory

Abstract

Regulating the sharing economy is one of the most important aspects in the development of a business model that has developed rapidly due to the widespread adoption of digital technologies and is closely linked to the fast pace of institutional changes. The present study aims to develop strategies for regulating the sharing economy through the application of game theory. The authors identify common cooperative and non-cooperative strategies in the interaction of two participants: the state and the company. The matrix of strategies is based on the results of the analysis, which considers the interaction benefits, costs, and the positive and negative effects of this process. These strategies are exemplified in scenarios of interaction between the state and the sharing economy company in relation to three possible problems: environmental pollution, parking deficiency, and budget deficit. Furthermore, the study presents a comprehensive payoff matrix and provides a description of various sustainable and long-term scenarios. It also highlights the key parameters that should be taken into account when selecting a behavioral strategy for economic agents. In addition, the study establishes that supporting industries and projects of the sharing economy, as well as creating conditions or attracting investments, increasing public trust in government and business, and involving various social groups in resolving social problems are essential elements in the harmonious development of the sharing economy. These elements contribute to its potential to raise living standards. The practical significance of this study lies in the possibility of applying its results in the implementation of social and ecological objectives through the advancement of sharing economy initiatives.

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