Directed Digital Dissidence in Autocracies

Abstract

Abstract In this book, we use the case of China to examine how state actors can transform the internet and online discourse into a key strategic element for maintaining the government and relieving domestic pressure on national institutions. Although scholars have long known that the democratizing influence of the internet can be blunted by autocratic states, in this book, we show that the online sphere can effectively be co-opted by states like China and transformed into a supporting institution. Our theory, directed digital dissidence, explains how autocracies manage critical online information flows and what impact this management has on mass opinion and behavior. While the expansion of the internet may stimulate dissidence, it also provides the central government an avenue to direct that dissent away from themself and toward selected targets. Under the strategy of directed digital dissidence, the Internet becomes a mechanism to dissipate threats by serving as a targeted relief valve rather than a building pressure cooker. We consider the process and impact of this evolving state-led manipulation of the political internet using data and examples from China. We employed an original large-scale random survey of Chinese citizens to measure Internet use, social media use, and political attitudes. We also consider the impact of the state firewall. Beyond simply identifying it, we focus on testing the effectiveness of the government strategy with empirical data. We also consider how dissent can be redirected across a broader range of targets, including nonstate actors and other nations.

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