Induction and certainty in the physics of Wolff and Crusius

Abstract

In this paper, we analyse conceptions of induction and certainty in Wolff and Crusius, highlighting their competing conceptions of physics.We discuss (i) the perspective of Wolff, who assigned induction an important role in physics, but argued that physics should be an axiomatic science containing certain statements, and (ii) the perspective of Crusius, who adopted parts of the ideal of axiomatic physics but criticized the scope of Wolff's ideal of certain science.Against interpretations that take Wolff's proofs in physics to be based on empirical statements that are probable, we show how inductively established statements, coupled with assumptions concerning the uniformity of nature, can be certain according to Wolff.We examine Crusius' little known work on physics and show that he attacked Wolff, arguing that many statements of physics are probable.We provide a discussion of the reception of methodological rules similar to Newton's Regulae Philosophandi, discussing different interpretations of such rules.We conclude by briefly hinting at how the debate between Wolff and Crusius provides historical context for understanding Kant's philosophy of natural science.

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