Demand for Gambling

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, the quid pro quo theory of gambling is presented as the demand for an expected income transfer that is work-free. The theoretical literature on the utility and disutility of labor is explored next. The variability of the demand for gambling is explained by alternative ways in which the consumer could view the opportunity cost of the wager and by alternative consumer expectations regarding the consumption value of the gambling income winnings. This section also reviews the empirical evidence supporting these sources of gambling variation. A number of additional sections cover a variety of topics: two complications of the theory, a review of the conventional theory of the demand for gambling for comparison, the insurance-purchasing gambler, the entertainment theory of the demand for gambling, lotteries as an exception to the quid pro quo theory, and the implications of gambling theory for the demand for insurance.

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