Abstract This chapter traces some of the practical implications of the tenet (that credence claims are opaque). The chapter begins with an exploration of how the tenet affects decision theory in general, and then the rest of the chapter explores two cases in depth. The first case is the two-envelope paradox. A simple version of the paradox is set out, and analysis in the light of the tenet leads to a general restriction on acceptable decision tables. The second case arises in welfare economics (or social choice theory) where decisions may affect multiple people, and a standard framework for approaching these decisions is set out, and various positions in the literature (including utilitarianism, egalitarianism, and prioritarianism) are briefly described. The ex ante Pareto principle is introduced, along with its role in this literature. Given the tenet, this principle is shown to be incoherent as it stands, and a replacement (inspired by supervaluationism) is outlined along with some of its implications for various debates in welfare economics.
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