Governance of Greenwashing Behaviors: A Perspective of Heterogeneous Firm Types

Abstract

Corporate greenwashing in response to carbon neutrality strategies has received substantial academic attention. Distinct from previous studies, this paper establishes a differential game model incorporating both green and brown enterprise types. The model compares greenness and total profits under two government scenarios: subsidies for green enterprises and the regulation of brown enterprises. It further analyzes the mechanism behind brown enterprise greenwashing formation. The results show that subsidies alone encourage brown enterprises to engage in greenwashing. However, government regulation inhibits such behaviors, with the inhibition effect positively correlated to regulatory intensity. Consumers’ green perception of enterprises also significantly drives brown enterprise greenwashing degrees. Higher green enterprise perception coefficients reduce greenwashing, while higher brown enterprise perception coefficients increase it. Differential game and simulation analyses reveal that greenwashing governance should consider both direct policy effects on brown enterprises and indirect subsidy effects on green enterprises.

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