Rethinking ‘causality’ in quantitative human geography

Abstract

Abstract Causality is at the core of much contemporary discussion in social sciences, philosophy, and computer science—from the establishment of basic definitions of causality to developing methods for causal inference, this discussion is increasingly finding voice within geographical literature. However, geographers have long discussed (and differed) about the role “causality” plays in our work. We present a history of contemporary definitions of causality arising from philosophy and examine how these intellectual currents interact with past and present geographical thinking about causal relations. In particular, we focus on how new thinking about counterfactual causality can help re‐route inquiry around a well‐known impasse: law‐based causality in geography. In other words, while different perspectives around “laws” of geography exist, we argue that it is more productive to put aside these differences and find common ground in counterfactual causal thinking. To demonstrate, we outline new kinds of scholarship enabled by counterfactual causality and contemporary challenges that counterfactual causality faces in spatial analysis. Throughout, we refer interested readers to contemporary work on spatial causal inference and methods useful for scholars interested in analysing causal relationships in geographical systems.

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