Wolff on Obligation

Abstract

Abstract In this chapter, I both outline and offer an alternative to the standard psychologistic reading of Wolff’s account of obligation, according to which obligation consists in being motivated by an occurrent representation. I argue that Wolff’s concept of obligation should be understood in terms of what I call his theory of ideal practical rationality––that is, the normative theory of rational agency based on the ideal use of the rational faculties. On this view, obligation indicates the normative relation between putative actions and ideal agents. It prescribes how agents ought to act by virtue of how an ideally rational agent would act. After considering two potential issues this interpretation faces, I sketch the reception of Wolff’s account of obligation through the lens of the theory of ideal practical rationality.

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