Safety analysis of evaluation and acceptance processes for space systems and operations based on system-theoretic approach

Abstract

The proposed analysis consists of identifying systemic aspects that can influence safety and mission fulfillment in the Evaluation and Acceptance Processes of Space Systems and Operations for Launch through the application of System-Theoretic Process Analysis, a technique capable of identifying potential hazardous design and operational flaws, including system design errors and unsafe interactions among multiple procedures and system components. This research identifies losses, hazards, system-level safety constraints, the control structure of the general system, unsafe control actions, loss scenarios that could occur and related causal factors, detecting improvement possibilities for future verifications, evaluations, approvals, and acceptances of space systems and launch operations. These findings can promote safety in space system designs and operations, supporting the activities conducted by launch vehicle and payload developers, certification authorities, and launch centers management, enabling means to proactively act in order to mitigate risks, avoiding unsafe actions and undesired system behaviors, or even to mitigating their consequences. The practical applications of this work can result in safety and mission fulfillment improvements for safety management systems, launch approval regulations and standards; launch operation procedures; space systems design; vehicle, payload, and ground support equipment productions; systems testing; and launch authorization processes.

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