References

• 1991Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations33,089 cited
• 1981Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects8,724 cited
• 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
• 2012Who Creates Jobs? Small versus Large versus Young1,945 cited
• 1986Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms1,215 cited
• 2000Hierarchies and the Organization of Knowledge in Production1,201 cited
• 1995SPECIFIC AND GENERAL KNOWLEDGE, AND ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE979 cited
• 2002Authority and Communication in Organizations968 cited
• 1984Chapter 22 Panel data852 cited
• 1994The Firm as a Communication Network763 cited
• 2011Do the SEC's enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct?742 cited
• 2008When Does Coordination Require Centralization?629 cited
• 2000Panel Data Discrete Choice Models with Lagged Dependent Variables557 cited
• 2023Using and Interpreting Fixed Effects Models539 cited
• 2014Inconsistent Regulators: Evidence from Banking *480 cited
• 2001