Does employee ownership improve labour investment efficiency? Evidence from European firms

Abstract

This paper studies the impact of non-executive employee ownership on labour investment efficiency for a sample of European firms. It empirically documents a negative association between employee ownership and labour investment inefficiency, which serves an inverse measure of labour investment efficiency. This negative association is notably more pronounced for firms reporting higher discretionary accruals in their financial statements (i.e. firms with higher information asymmetry) and for those with a lower percentage of independent directors (i.e. firms with greater agency problems). As such, this paper offers evidence that employee shareholding enhances employment decisions through two channels: reduced information asymmetry and improved management monitoring.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 11 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.