When Gorillas Strike: Constitutional Protection of Non-Market-Institutions in Labor Law

Abstract

Abstract The “wildcat strike” against the poor working conditions of the bike couriers of the delivery service Gorilla at the beginning of 2021 ended in numerous dismissals by the employer. The trade unions did not support the strike, so that participation in the work stoppage was deemed unlawful by the courts. Under German law, strikes are only permitted as a means of exerting pressure in collective bargaining. However, it must be asked whether, with the changes in forms of employment and the associated limits to trade union representation of interests, it is still justified to regard the right to strike exclusively as an appendage of collective bargaining autonomy. Not only the pressure of international law, but also Gunther Teubner’s concept of non-market institutions as necessarily resistant collective actors against economic profit pressures call for the further development of legal protection of collectivities. Alternative labor struggles for the often precarious conditions of increasing mobile, digitalized and transnational gainful employment would then have to be recognized under certain conditions.

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