On the Support of Cognitive Theory in Opposition to Behavior Theory: A Methodological Problem

Abstract

I am particularly pleased to comment on Brewer’s paper. It is impressive in its depth and scope of scholarship, and I am happy to congratulate him. Yet without diminishing the significance of his review, I disagree with its overall implication, and that disagreement and this conference provide the opportunity to discuss a serious methodological problem. Can we really marshall an evidential basis for the cognitive states and operations we want to investigate? Can we do that, using the standard manipulation–response designs carried over from behaviorism, perhaps venturing a measure or two, and with good old-fashioned parsimony, sticking to one or two hypothetical cognitive states at a time?

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