Public (In)Tolerance of Government Non‐Compliance with High Court Decisions

Abstract

Governments‐ compliance with high court decisions is a critical factor affecting judicial independence, power, and legitimacy. Under what conditions do citizens tolerate incumbent non‐compliance with apex court decisions? Some theories yield predictions that government supporters will be more tolerant towards non‐compliance, while others assert that citizens may value judicial review irrespective of their political preferences. Although the underlying logic of both arguments is plausible, the contexts that shape citizens‐ non‐compliance preferences are not well identified. Focusing on the moderating effect of elite behavior and contextual factors, we demonstrate that supporters of incumbent governments are more tolerant of government non‐compliance in the years following high-profile shows of interbranch attacks or government disregard of high court decisions, and in environments where the media is lacking independence.

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