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Implementation Via Information Design in Binary-Action Supermodular Games
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References

  • 1996Potential Games3,617 cited
  • 2011Bayesian Persuasion1,913 cited
  • 1990Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities1,810 cited
  • 1974Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies1,630 cited
  • 1993Global Games and Equilibrium Selection1,547 cited
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  • 2004Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks782 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited
  • 2019Information Design: A Unified Perspective531 cited
  • 1992The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”523 cited
  • 2002Coordination risk and the price of debt507 cited
  • 1989Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs459 cited
  • 2016Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games380 cited
  • 2003Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities342 cited
  • 1997

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The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
297 cited

Cited by

  • 2022Preparing for the Worst but Hoping for the Best: Robust (Bayesian) Persuasion43 cited
  • 2025Adversarial coordination and public information design42 cited