The polycrisis and EU security and defence competences

Abstract

From the 2009 sovereign debt crisis to the 2022 Russian full-scale war in Ukraine, the EU has experienced a succession of intersecting crises, or a ‘polycrisis’. We examine how this polycrisis has impacted the EU's role in security and defence. While the EU's competences in security and defence have long suffered from disagreements among member states, they have shown notable developments since Brexit, and most importantly, since the 2022 war in Ukraine. We make a two-step argument to shed light on why the polycrisis has had these differentiated effects over time. The first move we make is to unpack the polycrisis to explain why and when an increase in competences may take place. We single out two crises that offer pathways for positive politicisation, leading to increased cooperation and competences: an external military threat and an internal crisis in the form of the loss of a major veto player. In a second step, we argue that the existence of an alternative organisation, NATO, helps us explain where and what cooperation can take place. Shared military threats can lead to complementary rather than substitutive empowerment at least during the duration of the crisis.

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