Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy

Abstract

Abstract Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy provides, twice each year, a collection of the best current work in the field of ancient philosophy. Each volume features original essays that contribute to an understanding of a wide range of themes and problems in all periods of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, from the beginnings to the threshold of the Middle Ages. From its first volume in 1983, OSAP has been a highly influential venue for work in the field and has often featured essays of substantial length as well as critical essays on books of distinctive importance. Volume LXIII contains a discussion of whether Plato subscribes to a two-world metaphysics in the Philebus; a new interpretation of Aristotle on future contingent statements in De Interpretatione according to which such statements are false in virtue of expressing modal necessity; a defence of Aristotle’s argument in Metaphysics Γ that one cannot deny the principle of non-contradiction; a unified account of the knowable (gnōrimon) in Aristotle’s works; an argument for Aristotle’s textual and philosophical revisions of Eudemian Ethics 5. 2 in Nicomachean Ethics 6. 2; and an account of Stoic metaphysics as responding to challenges posed by Plato’s Sophist.

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