Shifting the Deckchairs

Abstract

Abstract Scholars regard the delegation of contentious or failure-prone tasks to semi-autonomous bureaucracies (or ‘quangos’), and salient examples of officials in these organizations ‘taking the flack’ for ministers, as proof of the so-called ‘agency strategy’ of blame management. But how can we explain cases of administrative re-centralization, in which quangos are abolished and high-risk functions returned to ministerial control? Focusing on the UK government’s ‘public bodies’ reforms initiated in 2010, and the re-centralization of immigration, legal aid, and child maintenance functions in particular, this chapter investigates this inconsistency between blame theory and empirical bureaucratic reform by comparing blame-management strategies prior to and following the loss of each quango. It focuses on a single blame forum (independent value-for-money audits) and draws on quantitative and qualitative comparisons over the decade 2005–2015. It finds that politicians cope with the loss of the quango scapegoat by, in part, switching to ‘problem-denial’ tactics of blame management.

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