Emotions do not enter grammar because they are constructed (by grammar)

Abstract

This paper explores the relation between language and emotion and thus contributes to both language sciences and affective sciences. In both fields, insights from the other field are conspicuously absent. The core empirical claim presented is that there are no grammatical categories dedicated to encoding emotions. This seems to be universally the case and hence appears to be no accident. The absence of grammatical categories dedicated to encoding emotions is surprising given the otherwise close connection between language and emotions as evidenced by phylogenetic, ontogenetic, and neurological properties. Hence, one cannot attribute the absence of emotion categories to a complete disconnect between language and emotions (or cognition more generally). Moreover, one might expect such categories to exist, based on cognitive and evolutionary considerations. The conclusion to be drawn is that emotions are not to be considered primitives that could be directly linked to grammatical categories, but instead that emotions are constructed. In this way, the properties of grammar provide new evidence for the theory of constructed emotions. It is further proposed that linguistic theory may shed light on how emotions are constructed. Specifically, the article explores the hypothesis that the same architecture is responsible for the construction of complex linguistic expressions and for the construction of emotions. As such, the article introduces a novel research agenda, i.e. the emotional spine hypothesis, which invites new avenues of interdisciplinary research.

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