Narrowly person-affecting axiology: a reconsideration

Abstract

A narrowly person-affecting (NPA) axiology is an account of the moral ranking of outcomes such that the comparison of any two outcomes depends on the magnitude and weight of individuals’ well-being gains and losses between the two, with well-being gains counting towards moral betterness and well-being losses against. NPA axiology underlies the narrow person-affecting principles: one outcome is not morally better than a second, all-things-considered or even in some respect, unless better for at least one person. This paper systematically explores NPA axiology. It argues that NPA axiology yields an outcome ranking that satisfies three fundamental axioms: Pareto, Anonymity and, plausibly, Pigou-Dalton. The axiology is neutral to non-well-being considerations (desert); and (assuming well-being measurability) leads to the Repugnant Conclusion (RC). In short, NPA axiology provides a grounding for Paretian, equity-regarding welfarism, albeit one that includes the RC.

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