Wimpy Retributivism and the Promise of Moral Influence Theories

Abstract

Abstract Grant that the conversational theory makes room for a minimal form of retributivism, one that only renders deserved comparatively mild forms of blame and punishment. Even granting this, a cautious advocate of a basic desert conception of blame and punishment might find compelling reasons to refrain from blaming and punishing. This might lead one from minimal to wimpy retributivism. One reason for this arises from our epistemic uncertainty as to whether wrongdoers act with free will; if they do not, they do not deserve blame or punishment. Another arises from the risk that we might punish too harshly. Do these reasons force the retributivist to quietism? In this chapter, it is argued that moral influence theories of responsibility can be used as a supplement rather than a competitor to a basic desert-based theory, thereby supplying even the wimpy retributivist with resources to justify blame and punishment.

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