Aristotle's Practical Epistemology

Abstract

Abstract Aristotle’s Practical Epistemology presents a novel interpretation of Aristotle’s influential account of practical wisdom (phronēsis) by situating the topic within his broader theory of ethical knowledge. Interpreters have long struggled to make sense of the disparate features Aristotle seems to attribute to practical wisdom, particularly its role in bringing about individual choices and actions that fulfill the demands of the virtues of character and its status as an intellectual excellence or virtue of thought that is the analog, in the domain of ethical action, of theoretical wisdom (sophia) and craft (tekhnē), in their respective domains. The main contention of the book is that these features can be united when we see that phronēsis is a distinctively practical form of understanding. The book begins from the idea that Aristotle first establishes that we have ground-level ethical knowledge, described in the Nicomachean Ethics as ethical experience (empeiria), as a result of a decent upbringing, before identifying practical wisdom as a deeper form of understanding. This understanding involves a grasp of explanations, just as theoretical wisdom and craft do, yet it does not consist in a form of scientific or theoretical knowledge, which would be detached from practice. Rather, the understanding of the personal of practical wisdom involves grasping the goals that are characteristic of the several virtues of character—justice, courage, generosity, and the like—in such a way that they can be brought to bear on particular contexts of deliberation. That comprehensive perspective is why Aristotle thinks of practical wisdom as the same understanding as political wisdom.

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