Pricing policies of dual-channel green supply chain: considering manufacturers’ dual behavioural preferences and government subsidies

Abstract

As the green economy and e-commerce evolve, some manufacturers begin to engage in green production and use online direct channels to enhance competitiveness. However, the additional cost of green production makes manufacturers often show dual behavioural preferences of fairness concern and risk aversion when making decisions. Based on this, this study constructs the optimal pricing model of a dual-channel green supply chain, considering dual behavioural preferences of manufacturers’ fairness concern and risk aversion. In addition, no government subsidy, government research and development cost subsidy and green degree subsidy are also considered. This paper uses the Stackelberg game to find the optimal solution for the model. The findings illustrate that (1) Government subsidy mechanisms cannot coordinate the effects of manufacturers’ dual behavioural preferences on pricing policies of a dual-channel green supply chain. (2) Under the three different government subsidy conditions, manufacturers’ fairness concern and risk aversion will all reduce the green degree of products and online direct price of products. (3) The government research and development cost subsidy and green degree subsidy can both improve the green degree of products, offline retail price, market demand and members’ expected profits.

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