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Governments increasingly appeal to citizens contribute to common goals in natural resource management, nature conservation or invasive species eradication. The contributing citizen is sometimes understood as able to graduate from being extrinsically motivated – by rewards, financial incentives or penalties – toward becoming intrinsicallymotivated. In this paper, we problematize the relative willingness of citizen contributions to aid the state in invasive species management, using the wild boar in Norway as a case study. Through a qualitative study using interviews, document analysis and participant observation with hunters, officials, landowners, farmers and veterinarians, We show how the relationship between the state and its citizens can make or break collaboration Our research suggests that rewards and financial incentives by the government are not a given for contribution. Instead, citizens willingness rests on ongoing communication with the government, its perceived gratitude and feedback to their contributions, the legacy of past collaborations and various sociopolitical factors about the role of hunters in aiding the state. In this way, our study demonstrates that motivations are not static individual properties, able to be predicted with models, but complex products of hunter identities in relation to the state and wildlife, and continuous evaluations of how the state nudges its citizens. In brief, we argue that even intrinsic motivations are embedded motivations in a sociopolitical context. • When the state outsources labor to citizens, it can both empower and alienate them. • Hunters can form a powerful labor force, but can also question management premises. • Motivations for contributing to management are highly vulnerable to changes. • The division between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations is a false lead. • Nudging and shoving citizens represents a careful balancing act for states.
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