Further critical reflections on the notion of a “population psychology”.

Abstract

The present article extends critical considerations that I offered in an earlier article challenging the proposition by Lundh that population-level research should be regarded as a branch of psychological science. It is again acknowledged that population-level research can track the incidence of psychological phenomena, i.e., sensations, perceptions, judgments, cognitions, emotions, behaviors, etc., within and across various subgroups of individuals, and this, I argue, is what warrants the designation of such research as "psycho-demographic." Such research can complement, but should not be considered part of, psychological science. It is explained that this view does not require strict adherence to a mechanistic understanding of causation in the domain of psychological phenomena. Finally, it is suggested that drawing and maintaining a clear distinction between psycho-demography and psychological science will help to correct the long-prevalent but false notion that the knowledge produced by population-level research is interpretable as knowledge about individuals.

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