State Capacity and Administrative Burdens on Citizens: Time for Export Controls and Transparency

Abstract

Abstract This article examines the relationships between state infrastructural capacity, administrative burdens, and incentives facing political actors. Three recent case studies of federal capacity‐building projects with limited success to date point to the roles of bureaucratic proceduralism, risk aversion, and internal administrative burdens imposed in the name of accountability. A path forward requires greater transparency by public servants and commitment by political elites to act as stewards of state capacity, ending the practice of exporting internally generated burdens outward to program users. In addition, political elites must shoulder more responsibility as active agents in the accountability process and providing political capital for risk‐taking and innovation in systems renewal and service delivery. Voters may not provide immediate rewards for this action, but citizens' trust in the institutions of the state will benefit over the longer‐term.

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