Knowledge Sharing Among Hospitals of Different Levels: A Complex Network Evolutionary Game Approach

Abstract

Knowledge sharing among hospitals of different levels is essential for the effective utilization of medical resources. This paper develops a complex network evolutionary game model to examine the knowledge sharing behaviors between general hospitals and community health service centers, considering the influences of government reward and punishment mechanisms, as well as patient evaluations. Numerical simulations are employed to explore and analyze the effects of key factors on the evolution of strategies among game players. The results show that synergy benefits, government reward and punishment benefits, patient evaluation reward and punishment benefits, and sharing costs have significant impacts on the evolutionary outcomes of knowledge sharing among hospitals. Compared with general hospitals, community health service centers exhibit a stronger willingness to share knowledge. Enhancing the knowledge sharing capabilities of general hospitals and the learning capacities of community health service centers, fostering knowledge synergy, reducing sharing costs, while encouraging active patient participation, and implementing effective government reward and punishment mechanisms, can further promote knowledge sharing among these institutions and improve the overall quality of healthcare services. The findings also suggest that the proposed model has broader applications, not only in healthcare system but also in sectors where resource sharing and collaboration are critical. Policymakers can leverage these insights to design more effective strategies that promote cooperation and efficient resource allocation across different institutions.

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