Sustainable and Resilient Governance of Common‐Pool Resources: A Critical Analysis of Non‐Cooperative and Cooperative Game Theory Applications

Abstract

ABSTRACT Common‐pool resources theory has been pervasively explored through strategic approaches. To this end, non‐cooperative and cooperative game theory applications have been developed. Two scholars have dominated the theoretical formulations aiming to find effective solutions for governing the commons—Garret Hardin and Elinor Ostrom. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence from Hardin, Ostrom, and more recent scholars and theories, this paper aims to provide an excursus on the game theory formalizations supporting the commons theory. This study argues that this process implied a revisitation of commons governance from threat to opportunity. This evidence was also moved from the emergence of new commons and their preservation. This revival led to new solutions and explorations for sustainable development, polycentrism, and resilient governance of common‐pool resources. These perspectives can stimulate new research, policies, and strategies benefiting from ecological and development economics research, public management scholarship and practice, regulation, and decision‐making.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 11 citations exist upstream.