Governing Within Semirigid Limits: Navigating the Centralization–Decentralization Paradox in Blockchain‐Based Platforms

Abstract

ABSTRACT Blockchain‐based platforms can facilitate data sharing and coordination in interorganizational ecosystems by enabling secure, tamper‐evident recordkeeping and streamlined, trust‐minimized transactions across organizational boundaries. However, their decentralized architecture may conflict with the centralized control exercised by platform sponsors, giving rise to a centralization–decentralization paradox. This study explores how this paradox unfolds in a large, blockchain‐based logistics platform that was ultimately discontinued. Through an in‐depth, longitudinal case study, we identify three interrelated governance contradictions—regarding ownership, trust, and growth—that triggered destabilizing oscillations between centralized and decentralized governance modes. We introduce the concept of semirigid limits to capture the bounded flexibility within which governance can be made and adapted under such paradoxical conditions. Our findings show that the centralization–decentralization paradox is especially difficult to navigate when strategic boundary conditions—here, industry competition, fragmented coordination, and high interdependencies—are present. Our study contributes to the paradox and governance literature by theorizing how governance contradictions emerge and persist and by identifying the mechanisms that constrain alignment and adaptation. We also offer guidance for managers in regard to addressing the competing demands of centralization and decentralization in interorganizational platforms.

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