Self-regulation, Autonomy, Rationality, and the Use of Arational Influences to Prevent Crime

Abstract

At least since the publication of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s Nudge, the potential of employing knowledge about the shortcomings of human cognition to influence the behavior of people in ways intended to aid them in becoming healthier, more economically secure and, indeed, happier has been the subject of considerable interest for scholars and policymakers. However, while the ethics of employing nudges to attempt to induce various types of behavior change in relation to these important public policy aims has received much attention, very little scrutiny has been directed toward the ethics of the current and potential employment of similar arational influences to prevent crime. This paper sets out to assess whether variations of three of the most prominent ethical concerns against the use of nudges provide us with good reasons to oppose the use of arational influences for crime prevention. It is first argued that moral concerns hinging on self-regulation and personal autonomy are not persuasive grounds from which to object to the use of these influences. However, the paper ends by arguing in favor of the view that employing arational influences to prevent crime is presumptively wrong if and when it subverts its target’s rationality.

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