References

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• 1978JOB MARKET SIGNALING **The essay is based on the author's doctoral dissertation (“Market Signalling: The Informational Structure of Job Markets and Related Phenomena,” Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1972), forthcoming as a book entitled Market Signaling: Information Transfer in Hinng and Related Screening Processes in the Harvard Economic Studies Series, Harvard University Press. The aim here is to present the outline of the signaling model and some of its conclusions. Generalizations of the numerical examples used for expositional purposes here are found in ibid, and elsewhere.