Government-affiliated intermediaries in climate policy: managing “productive tensions” between flexibility and control

Abstract

Abstract While there is growing agreement that government-affiliated intermediaries can be an asset in advancing climate policy, perspectives diverge on the precise governance arrangements and conditions under which they excel. Some view government-affiliated intermediaries as instruments that states can exert control over to achieve their centrally determined objectives. Others contend that such bodies work best when they have the autonomy to experiment and shape policy formulation. This article seeks to clarify these debates by demonstrating that there is value in adopting governance arrangements that keep these two approaches (instrumental/experimental) in tension. The argument here is that a governance approach, which balances instrumental and experimental logics, can generate “productive tensions” to manage trade-offs between flexibility and control. Using a process-tracing analysis, the article explores this argument through a case study of a government-affiliated intermediary in ­Quebec—Propulsion Québec—deliberately created by the state to intermediate between the public and private sectors in the electric transportation sector. Findings reveal productive tensions between the state and a government-affiliated intermediary, as well as between different government-affiliated intermediaries, but show that these tensions can be difficult to sustain over time. Overall, attending to these tensions allows for a deeper understanding of the governance arrangements and conditions under which government-affiliated intermediaries can advance climate policy.

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