The ironic misfortunes of ‘geographic theory’. Sceptic musings on a sexy oxymoron

Abstract

In this short piece, I engage with Henry W. Yeung’s (2024) diagnosis of a ‘philosophy envy’ affecting contemporary human geography to partially support his interpretation and equally argue against it. While I read geography’s infatuation with changing philosophical vogues as resulting in a deleterious theoretical hubris, the reasons for the academic and political pedigree that prevailing forms of geographic theory have purchased require a deeper epistemic scrutiny (and perhaps also a bit of spoof) than Yeung’s book allows for. Consequently, after preliminary derision of globalised scholarly infatuation with theory-making, I turn attention to two features of the epistemic structures underpinning mainstream critical geography, namely, constructivist schemes and parochial modes of justification, briefly taking issue with both. I end with a final coda about what could be expected of Theory of Geography as a subfield, calling simultaneously for a more substantive and purposeful philosophical reflection in geography and a sceptical take on theory to curve down its pure vanity.

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