Statistical theory of strategic delay under a deadline

Abstract

Delaying the start of tasks with deadlines is a widespread phenomenon that occurs across multiple domains. While delaying tasks can be maladaptive, here we propose that, in some situations, it results from an optimal time-management strategy. We propose a theoretical model of the strategic delay of the initiation of tasks with deadlines that relies on an unavoidable aspect of any projection into the future, namely, that the time it takes to complete a task is variable. This fundamental assumption distinguishes our theory from alternative theoretical accounts that invoke specific structures of preferences or costs to elucidate the occurrence of (adaptive or maladaptive) task-initiation delays. Our model captures the basic features of strategic delay and predicts a phenomenon that we demonstrate empirically, the ‘farther-earlier’ effect: decision-makers who live farther to their destinations (e.g., schools or offices) tend to arrive earlier than those who live closer. The same theory explains the widely documented tendency to repeatedly delay the initiation of a task (e.g., drafting a grant application) as the deadline for the completion of the task approaches. Our framework thus puts forth a normative theory in which various manifestations of strategic delay reflect an optimal adaptation to environmental statistics.

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