Nudging within political liberalism: A Two-Way justification for liberal democracies

Abstract

Abstract Over the years, the justification for nudging has been challenged on many levels, one of which regards ethical concerns. If nudges instrumentally exploit human biases, it might seem impossible to justify their implementation in liberal democracies. However, instead of disagreeing on nudging, some disagree on its moral premises. First, within the normative framework of political liberalism, the possibility of exploiting biases is conceivable based on the assumptions of compatibilism and Kantian constructivism: nudging would not infringe upon autonomy more than everyday external influences and a nudge can be overwritten by practical reason. Second, a two-way justification for exploiting biases at the public level in liberal democracies is proposed. Focusing on liberalism and the principle of avoiding harm to others, nudging could be a complementary intervention to coercive laws that are already justified from a public perspective to improve their efficiency. Focusing on democratic aspects and the majority’s will, nudging could be a per se type of intervention to reduce the gap between intentions and actions. These two strategies have never been presented as part of a unified view before, and this eschews the criticisms of violating people’s autonomy, technocratic turns, and slippery slopes, without requiring token transparency. Future research from various disciplines could benefit from this new categorization.

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