The role of aid bureaucracy heads: evidence from the allocation of Korean aid

Abstract

Research on foreign aid often relies on aggregated national allocations, yet this perspective overlooks the role of bureaucrats who determine where and how aid flows. Using a novel dataset on Korea’s tied aid spending by 178 bureaucracy heads representing 29 bureaucracies allocated to 105 recipient countries during the fiscal years of 2010 to 2022, I investigate bureaucracy-level aid outcomes. Focusing on the bureaucratic structure of Korean aid – where agencies are relatively uniformly insulated from political pressure due to limited oversight and control – I examine how the professional backgrounds and personal characteristics of agency heads shape tied aid allocation through socialization mechanisms. This study finds that bureaucracy heads with prior civil society experience and higher levels of education tend to allocate a lower portion of tied aid. Such extra-organizational experiences foster engagement with external professional communities and alignment with global norms toward aid untying. By contrast, those with civil servant backgrounds tend to allocate a higher portion of tied aid, as career bureaucrats are more likely to internalize organizational goals and adopt performance-oriented mindsets. Within Korea’s meritocratic bureaucracy, I illustrate how tied aid may be perceived as an effective tool for demonstrating bureaucratic competence.

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