Moral Standing, The Value of Lives, and Speciesism

Abstract

_""l"~;'~~~" ~ .>,<,-, ' , .<",'The question of who or what has moral standing, of who or what is a member of the moral community, has received wide exposure in recent years.Various answers have been extensively canvassed; and though controversy still envelops claims for the inclusion of the inanimate environment within the moral community, such claims on behalf of animals (or, at least, the "higher" animals) are now widely accepted.Morally, then, animals count.I do not myself think that we have needed a great deal of argument to establish this point; but numerous writers, obviously, have thought otherwise.In any event, no work of mine has ever denied that animals count.In order to suffer, animals do not have to be self-conscious, to have interests or beliefs or language, to have desires and desires related to their own future, to exercise self-critical control of their behaviour, or to possess rights; and I, a utilitarian, take their sufferings into account, morally.Thus, the scope of the moral community, at least so far as ("higher") animals are concerned, is not something I contest.I may disagree with some particular way of trying to show that animals possess moral standing, e.g., by ascribing them some variant of moral rights, ...

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 71 citations exist upstream.