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Are conscious thoughts and sensations conscious in the same way? The chapter gives an affirmative answer to this question. The chapter argues first for two independent claims: first, that Block's notion of access consciousness must be understood in terms of phenomenal consciousness, and in this sense phenomenal consciousness is the more fundamental notion; and second, that beliefs are never phenomenally conscious, though episodes of thinking are. This provides us with the sense in which thoughts and experiences are conscious: they are both a certain kind of occurrence or episode, that the chapter calls an episode in the stream of consciousness. This provides the answer to the initial question: there is a single way of being conscious which thoughts and experiences exhibit.
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Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.
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