Delegating powers: a transaction cost politics approach to policy making under separate powers

Unknown author

2000-07-01otherChoice Reviews Online910 citationsclosed

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American Constitutional Law and Politics Public Administration and Governance Public Policy and Administration Research

Abstract

In this path-breaking book, David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran produce the first unified theory of policy making between the legislative and executive branches. Examining major US policy initiatives from 1947 to 1992, the authors describe the conditions under which the legislature narrowly constrains executive discretion, and when it delegates authority to the bureaucracy.

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 910 citations exist upstream.

References

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