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The "Prospective View" of Obligation
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The "Prospective View" of Obligation (2011)The "Prospective View" of ObligationWhy more than what happens matters : robust rights and harmless wronging (2020)Why more than what happens ma…If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ (2015)If you justifiably believe th…What virtue ethics can learn from utilitarianism (2014)What virtue ethics can learn …Utilitarianism before Bentham (2014)Utilitarianism before BenthamUtilitarianism and fairness (2014)Utilitarianism and fairnessSubjective theories of well-being (2014)Subjective theories of well-b…Objective theories of well-being (2014)Objective theories of well-be…Epistemology and Cognition (1987)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Knowledge and its Limits (2002)Epistemic justification and the ignorance excuse (2017)Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought (2017)Prospective Possibilism (2017)A theory of justice original editionAn Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776)Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1978)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1975)Taking Rights Seriously (1978)11. Reasons and Persons (1986)Anarchy, State, and Utopia (2018)On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value (2018)Positive psychology is value-laden—It’s time to embrace it (2020)Dear Prudence (2021)The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being (2015)Philosophy of Technology (2019)
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  • 2014Subjective theories of well-being78 cited
  • 2014Utilitarianism and fairness66 cited
  • 2014Objective theories of well-being54 cited
  • 2015If you justifiably believe that you ought to Φ, you ought to Φ51 cited
  • 2014Utilitarianism before Bentham36 cited
  • 2014What virtue ethics can learn from utilitarianism20 cited
  • 2020Why more than what happens matters : robust rights and harmless wronging18 cited

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