Delegation in the Regulatory State: Independent Regulatory Agencies in Western Europe

Fabrizio Gilardi

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Regulation and Compliance Studies Administrative Law and Governance Public Policy and Administration Research

Abstract

Contents: Preface 1. Introduction 2. The Institutional Foundations of the Regulatory State 3. Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Credibility, Political Uncertainty, and Veto Players 4. The Formal Independence of Regulators: Empirical Analysis 5. Interdependent Delegation: The Diffusion of Independent Regulators Agencies 6. The Diffusion of Independent Regulatory Agencies: Empirical Analysis 7. Conclusion 8. Appendixes Bibliography Index

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