Hart’s PostscriptEssays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of Law’

Abstract

Published posthumously, the second edition of The Concept of Law contains one important addition, namely a substantial Postscript, in which Hart reflects upon some of the central concerns that have been expressed about the book since its publication in 1961. The Postscript is especially noteworthy because it contains Hart's only sustained response to the objections pressed by his foremost critic, Ronald Dworkin, who succeeded him to the Chair of Jurisprudence at Oxford. The Postscript focuses on a range of issues covering both Hart's substantive view and his methodological commitments. In particular, Hart endorses Inclusive Legal Positivism, asserting that this is a methodology of descriptive jurisprudence which he contrasts with Dworkin's normative jurisprudence or interpretivism, while denying that his theory of law has a semantic underpinning. The chapters in this collection address each of these issues. The book contains discussions of Hart's semantic commitments, his rejection of a normative jurisprudence as well as the extent to which he can embrace Inclusive Legal Positivism in a way that is consistent with his other stated positions. The book's contributors include advocates of alternative schools of Positivist jurisprudence, contributors to the methodological disputes in jurisprudence and experts on the relationship of philosophy of language to jurisprudence.

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