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This chapter studies the application of some of the central ideas developed by Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam concerning singular terms to general terms for kinds, showing that the theory of natural kind terms must in fact use additional ideas and different argumentation. It focuses on Kripke's notion of rigid designation and the generation of “exotic” necessary truths. It agrees with Putnam's theory about how natural kind terms function in ordinary language and still see that things may have been done differently even with the same results. It also suggests that nature does not fully determine the extension of vernacular natural kind terms, and science is not wholly responsible for discovering their true extensions.
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