International Relations and Global Climate Change

Abstract

Abstract Fighting climate change and COVID, which is currently done at the international level through the use of public goods based on subscriptions, is the case for charitable organisations within states. Such institutions lead to equilibrium situations that are clearly inefficient (not Pareto optimal). They also raise difficult questions of equity between developed, developing and emerging countries: If we want to promote more effective ways of fighting climate change or COVID type epidemics, how can we achieve such important goals at the global level without jeopardising the growth of poorer countries and making them still poorer? We will show that this is actually possible within certain limits. It will require the formation of broad-based climate or COVID coalitions that will be able to influence outsiders and force them to cooperate by sanctioning those who want to take advantage of carbon leakage. Such sanctions could take the form of carbon tariffs and other pressure measures. The result should be a solution that benefits both developed and developing countries while achieving global public goods that are efficient at the same time.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 288 citations exist upstream.