The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism

Abstract

In The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism, Brian Ellis develops the metaphysics of scientific realism to the point where it begins to take on the characteristics of a first philosophy, that is, as a theory about the nature of reality that can reasonably adjudicate on theories in other fields of enquiry in which assumptions are made about the basic nature of the world. As most people understand it, scientific realism is not yet such a theory. Nevertheless, Ellis shows that the original arguments that led to scientific realism may be deployed more widely than they were originally to fill out a more complete picture of what there is. Ellis shows that realistic theories of quantum mechanics, time, causality and human freedom – all problematic areas for the acceptance of scientific realism – can be developed satisfactorily. In particular, Ellis shows how moral theory can be recast to fit within this comprehensive metaphysical framework by developing a radical moral theory that conceives morals to be social ideals and which has implications for key ethical concepts such as moral responsibility, moral powers, moral rights and moral obligations. The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism is a bold and original development of the scientific characterization of reality by one of the world’s leading metaphysicians of science. It marks a significant contribution not only to philosophy of science and metaphysics but also to the search for a first philosophy.

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