Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, and Desire

Jessica Dawn Moss

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Classical Philosophy and Thought Philosophical Ethics and Theory Medieval Philosophy and Theology

Abstract

Aristotle holds that we desire things because they appear good to us - a view still dominant in philosophy now. But what is it for something to appear good? This text argues that the notion of the apparent good is crucial to understanding both Aristotle's psychological theory and his ethics.

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2021Desire as Belief 2016Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously 2019Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics 2019Reason in Action in Aristotle: A Reading of EE V.12/EN VI.12 2019Desiring under the Proper Guise 2018Aristotle’s Vocabulary of Pain 2019Sentimental perceptualism and the challenge from cognitive bases 2019Empeiria and Good Habits in Aristotle’s Ethics

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