Abstract The book considers Bertrand Russell’s work in logic, mainly from 1900 to 1910, and his work in epistemology and metaphysics, mainly from 1910 to 1924. The part on logic includes a discussion of his seminal article ‘On Denoting’ (1905), but is mainly concerned with the development of his simple and his ramified theory of types, which culminated in Principia Mathematica of 1910. The merits and drawbacks of these theories are noted. The parts on epistemology and metaphysics begin with his ‘principle of acquaintance’, which is supposed to explain our understanding of propositions, but is open to many objections. They continue with his account of what knowledge is, and with his ‘constructions’ of material objects and of minds, which aim to conform to what (according to him) can be known. They then discuss his changing views on propositions, and his largely tacit views on universals, before ending with an account of his ‘logically perfect’ language, and his claim that its structure mirrors the structure of the world
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